Cosmopolis and functional specialization

[Catherine B. King]

Hello Dick:
 
Yes:  Lonergan "consistently distinguished between theory and method."  And yes, commonly, method can mean "prescriptive," as you say, or a way to do things.  However, "method" in this theoretical context also refers to how our minds actually work--an analysis of the method of the mind, and not merely a good prescription for doing things.

Thus, in the theoretical context of Lonergan's work, when you say: "Lonergan's theory, in which the distinctions between experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, and loving are expressed in descriptive and explanatory propositions," he is giving you a THEORY of the METHOD of the mind: general empirical method. 

As an analysis of HOW the human mind already and actually works, we don't need to prescribe the theory in order for it to already be working in us. Thus, we can say, as you did:  ". . . that you and I agree can be verified in our own personal experiences."   Thus, we are not verifying that we can prescribe the method. Rather, we are verifying that, when we pay attention to our own minded operations, this happens to be what we find (and can verify).

Thus, the THEORY is of the METHOD of mind, which is also existential--we can verify it in our own personal experiences. 

If you have Method in Theology, read the first few pages and chapter 1, if you have time.  His meaning of METHOD is not merely prescriptive. That's a commonsense notion of method that you bring to the study--such "bringing" is not "uncommon" to those of us who try to explain what Lonergan meant by METHOD.

Regards,

Catherine

[Richard Moodey]

Hi Catherine,

I think it is reasonable to call the basic structure of human knowing and doing "the method of the mind."  As far as I can tell, we have no real disagreement about that basic structure, or about the necessity for self-appropriation as the way to verify propositions about that structure.  I do not want my desire to use "method" in a way that keeps clear the distinction between "theory" and "method" to obscure the broader area of agreement.

Best regards,

Dick

[Catherine B. King]

Hello Dick: 

So you think that we cannot have a theory about how something works (a method, in this case, of the mind), without obscuring the distinction between method and theory?  Or have I misunderstood your meaning? 

Catherine

[Richard Moodey]

Hi Catherine, 

I think that we can have a theory about how something works, and that a theory about a method need not obscure the distinction I want to maintain between theory and method.  I also think that this is something about which we agree. 

I also believe that one of the benefits of exploring areas of disagreement is clarifying the agreements that constitute the context within which responsible discussions about disagreements are possible.  These agreements are the metaphorical "ground" upon which we stand in carrying out the discussions.

Best regards,

Dick

[Catherine B. King]

Hello Dick:  Okay--back to the language diversion--again. 

That is, you and I can experience wonder and questions as they are raised; and you and I can talk about that experience in a multitude of concepts and metaphors, so that we both know that we are talking generally about the same kind of experience.  We can do so in the same way that E=MC2 refers generally to the same reality that Einstein referred to.  E=MC2 is mathematical language. It's how we go about knowing, and sharing that knowing, just as "raising questions of the type what is it" is a general statement about both our experiences, that we both can share and know.

However, the fact that we go through language to understand and come to know does not negate the fact that we have experiences, or that E=MC2 refers generally to how physics works, the reality of which we can express and communicate to others as shared experiences and/or knowledge through that language.  You and I either have the experience of wondering or we do not, regardless of how we expressed it--in metaphorical or conceptual language.  And if we didn't have language, we couldn't know and share the experiences as we do.

Do you think that having language or using metaphors is a block to our understanding of the real?

Catherine   

[Richard Moodey]

Hi Catherine,

You ask: "Do you think that having language or using metaphors is a block to our understanding of the real?"  No, definitely not.  I think that the acquisition of language by our hominin ancestors was necessary for the development of the progressively broader and deeper knowledge of the real that has been an essential aspect of the story of humanity.

Instead of "understanding the real," I think we might better say "knowing the real."  My knowing of the real is completed by acts of judging, that, as you have often and forcefully pointed out, must follow upon acts of understanding.  Language is important to judging, because I think acts of understanding, especially in the sciences, have to be formulated as hypotheses before they can be subjected to questions for reflection.

Best regards,

Dick

[JamesLoani]

As prior stated Bill.  Faith in God of the O.T. is faith in the same God unless you want to step into any number of various hersies dividing Jesus away from God of the O.T?

[TreyLus]

As prior stated Bill.  Faith in God of the O.T. is faith in the same God unless you want to step into any number of various hersies dividing Jesus away from God of the O.T?

I never understood that. Deviding Jesus away from God of the Old Testament, that is. Why do people do this?